Optimal Communication Complexity of Byzantine Consensus under Honest
  Majority by Momose, Atsuki & Ren, Ling
Optimal Communication Complexity of Byzantine Consensus under
Honest Majority
Atsuki Momose* and Ling Ren†
*Nagoya University - momose@sqlab.jp
†University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign - renling@illinois.edu
Abstract
Communication complexity is one of the most important efficiency metrics for distributed
algorithms, but considerable gaps in the communication complexity still exist for Byzantine
consensus, one of the most fundamental problems in distributed computing. This paper provides
three results that help close some of these gaps. (1) We present a Byzantine consistent broadcast
(BCB) protocol with linear communication complexity when f ≤ (1/2 − ε)n where ε is any
positive constant. The new protocol relies on an expander graph and a threshold signature
scheme. (2) The linear BCB protocol is used to obtain quadratic Byzantine broadcast (BB) and
Byzantine agreement (BA) under the same f ≤ (1/2− ε)n resilience (which is close to optimal
for BA). (3) We also show a quadratic communication lower bound of BCB with f ≥ (1/2+ε)n.
1 Introduction
Byzantine consensus1 is one of the most fundamental problems in distributed algorithms [21]. It
also serves as an important building block in cryptography and distributed systems. At a high level,
Byzantine consensus is the problem for n parties to agree on a value, despite that up to f of them
may behave arbitrarily (called Byzantine faults). Arguably the most important efficiency metric of
Byzantine consensus is the communication complexity, since communication will be the bottleneck
in applications like multi-party computation and cryptocurrency. Despite decades of research, there
are still significant gaps in the lower and upper bounds of communication complexity of Byzantine
consensus. This paper aims at filling some of these gaps.
Before describing our results, we first note that we will focus on the synchronous, authenti-
cated (i.e., with digital signatures and public-key infrastructure), and deterministic setting in this
paper. Focusing on deterministic protocols allows us to focus on the simpler and arguably more
fundamental worst-case (as opposed to expected) communication complexity. It is then natural
to assume synchrony: under asynchrony, many consensus problems have no deterministic solu-
tions [14]. Lastly, the reason to focus on authenticated protocols is two-fold: (i) they are more
widely used in practice [8, 27], and (ii) the communication complexity for unauthenticated Byzan-
tine broadcast and agreement has already reached optimal [6] (though gaps still exist for weaker
primitives).
The most widely studied Byzantine consensus problems are Byzantine Agreement (BA) and
Byzantine Broadcast (BB). Their optimal communication complexity has been an open question
1 We use the term “consensus” to refer to all variants of agreement and broadcast problems in this paper.
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for a very long time. Dolev and Reischuk proved that a quadratic number of messages are nec-
essary for deterministic BB/BA protocols [10]. But for decades, the best known protocol in the
synchronous, authenticated and deterministic setting is the classic Dolev-Strong protocol [12], which
uses quadratic messages but cubic communication. The reason is that in Dolev-Strong, the mes-
sages can contain up to f+1 signatures. While randomized BA/BB protocols can achieve expected
quadratic [13, 17, 7, 23, 4, 2] or even sub-quadratic [18, 9, 1] communication, they do not close
the gap on the worst-case communication complexity. On a side note, most of the sub-quadratic
randomized protocol reduce communication by sampling a smaller committee to run consensus;
while effective, such techniques shed less insights on the “inherent” communication complexity of
the consensus problems.
Only recently, Yin et al. [27] provided the necessary tools to achieve quadratic communication
for deterministic BA/BB with f < n/3. This still leaves open whether BA/BB can be solved with
quadratic worst-case communication if f ≥ n/3. The main result of this paper is to answer this
question in the affirmative if f ≤ (12 − ε)n for any positive constant ε.
A key stepping stone for our new upper bounds is a linear communication protocol for Byzantine
Consistent Broadcast (BCB) with f ≤ (12 − ε)n. BCB is perhaps one of the easiest problems in
the Byzantine consensus family. It only requires honest parties not to decide on conflicting values;
it is OK that some honest parties decide but others do not. Our key new technique is to utilize
an expander graph to check for inconsistent values. An expander has a constant number of edges
per vertex—ensuring constant communication per party and linear communication in total—and
good connectivity to detect inconsistent values effectively. Another important building block is the
well-established use of threshold signature [7, 4, 27].
Back to BA/BB, we can now repeat the linear BCB f+1 = O(n) times, each time with a different
party serving as the BCB sender. This gives the desired O(n2) communication. Some additional
techniques including the linear view-change method of Yin et al. [27] are used to transition safely
between BCB instances.
On a side note, we feel the importance of BCB may have been somewhat overlooked. The most
important application for Byzantine consensus today is Byzantine fault tolerant (BFT) replication
systems [26, 25, 8] (more recently called blockchains). Most BFT replication protocols (possibly
without realizing it) run a sequence of BCB instances with a few extra steps [8, 19, 27]. In this
sense, BB and BA turn out to be overkill for practical protocols. Therefore, we would like to
characterize the communication complexity of BCB. Towards this end, besides the above linear
protocol for f ≤ (12 − ε)n, we also establish a lower bound showing that BCB cannot be solved
with sub-quadratic communication if f ≥ (12 + ε)n.
Lastly, toward potentially practical applications, we present a BFT replication protocol with
f ≤ (12 − ε)n and amortized linear communication. The protocol builds on the new linear BCB
protocol and adds some modifications to work without lock-step rounds.
Summary of results. Table 1 summarizes the current landscape of Byzantine consensus com-
munication complexity and highlights our new results. We also list the new results below. Let ε
be any positive constant.
1. A Byzantine consistent broadcast protocol with linear communication with f ≤ (12 − ε)n;
2. A quadratic communication lower bound for Byzantine consistent broadcast if f ≥ (12 + ε)n;
3. A Byzantine broadcast protocol and a Byzantine agreement protocol with quadratic commu-
nication with f ≤ (12 − ε)n;
4. A practical BFT replication protocol with amortized linear communication with f ≤ (12−ε)n.
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Problem Resilience Upper Bound Lower bound
Byzantine Consistent
Broadcast (BCB)
f < n/3
f ≤ (12 − ε)n
(12 + ε)n ≤ f < n− 1
O(n) [25, 7]
O(n)
O(n3) [12]
Ω(n)
Ω(n)
Ω(n2)
Byzantine Reliable
Broadcast (BRB)
f < n/2
f < n− 1
O(n2) [16, 24]
O(n3) [12]
Ω(n2) [10] a
Byzantine Broadcast
(BB)
f ≤ (12 − ε)n
f < n− 1
O(n2) b
O(n3) [12]
Ω(n2) [10]
Byzantine Agreement
(BA)
f < n/3
f ≤ (12 − ε)n
f < n/2 c
O(n2) [6]
O(n2)
O(n3) [12] d
Ω(n2) [10]
a The lower bound for BB in [10] can be easily extended to BRB. We give a proof in Appendix
A for completeness.
b The number of messages in [12] is O(n2), but a message includes up to f +1 signatures, making
the communications cubic. We do not know a way for [12] to utilize threshold signatures because
every round in the protocol requires a different threshold.
c BA is impossible if f ≥ n/2 [15].
d Although [12] presents a BB protocol, it can be extended to BA with an initial round to
multicast inputs. See more details in Section 5.
Table 1: Upper and lower bounds for worst-case communication complexity of Byzantine consensus.
ε is any positive constant. We assume f = Θ(n). New results of this paper are marked bold.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces definitions,
models and notations. Section 3 presents a BCB protocol with linear communications under honest
majority. Section 4 provides a quadratic communication lower bound for BCB under honest minor-
ity. Section 5 presents BB and BA protocols with quadratic communication under honest majority.
Section 6 provides a practical BFT replication protocol. Finally, we discuss future directions and
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
Execution model. We define a protocol as an algorithm for a set of parties. There are a set of n
parties, of which at most f < n are Byzantine faulty and behave arbitrarily. We assume f = Θ(n).
All presented protocols are secure against f adaptive corruption that can happen anytime during
the protocol execution. A party that is not faulty throughout the execution is said to be honest
and faithfully execute the protocol. We use the term quorum to mean the minimum number of all
honest parties, i.e., n− f . A protocol proceeds in synchronous rounds. If an honest party sends a
message at the beginning of some round, an honest recipient receives the message at the end of that
round. We assume digital signatures and public-key infrastructure (PKI), and use 〈x〉r to denote
a message x signed by party r. As commonly done in Byzantine consensus, we abstract away the
details of cryptography, namely, we assume the signature schemes enjoy ideal unforgeability. We
further assume a threshold signature scheme [7, 22], in which a set of signatures 〈x〉r for a message
x from t (the threshold) distinct parties can be combined into a threshold signature for x with the
same length as an individual signature.
Complexity metrics. The communication complexity of a protocol is the maximum number of
bits sent by all honest parties combined across all executions. Since all messages in our protocols
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are signed, we use the signature size κ as the unit of measure for communication. We assume the
size of any input value is on the order of κ. Thus, when we report O(n2) communication complexity
for a protocol, its bit complexity is O(n2κ). The lower bounds (in this work and prior work [10]),
however, are lower bounds on the number of messages. With no assumptions on the message size,
this leaves a gap of κ in a pair of matching upper and lower bounds. If we further assume that
every message in authenticated protocols is signed, then matching bounds are tight.
Byzantine consensus variants. There are two main variants of Byzantine consensus: broadcast
and agreement. In agreement, each party has an input value, and all parties try to decide on
the same value. In broadcast, a designated sender denoted by rs has an input vin to broadcast
to all parties. The broadcast problem further has several variants. The consistency and validity
requirements of the three variants are the same. The difference lies in their termination requirement.
BRB relaxes it over BB and allows that either all parties decide or no party decides. BCB further
relaxes it and allows some parties to decide while others do not.
Definition 1 (Byzantine Consistent Broadcast (BCB)). A Byzantine consistent broadcast protocol
must satisfy (i) consistency: if two honest parties r and r′ decide values v and v′, then v = v′,
and (ii) validity: if the sender rs is honest, then all honest parties decide the input value vin and
terminate.
Definition 2 (Byzantine Reliable Broadcast (BRB)). A Byzantine reliable broadcast protocol must
satisfy (i) consistency: same as above, (ii) valitity: same as above, and (iii) totality: if an honest
party decides a value, then every honest party decides a value.
Definition 3 (Byzantine Broadcast (BB)). A Byzantine broadcast protocol must satisfy (i) consis-
tency: same as above, (ii) valitity: same as above, and (iii) termination: every honest party decides
a value and terminates.
Definition 4 (Byzantine Agreement (BA)). A Byzantine agreement protocol must satisfy (i) con-
sistency: same as above, (ii) validity: if all honest parties have the same input value, then all honest
parties decide that value, and (iii) termination: same as above.
3 Byzantine Consistent Broadcast with Linear Communication
In this section, we show that BCB can be solved with linear communications under honest majority,
as formally stated in Theorem 1. To complete the proof of Theorem 1, we present a BCB protocol
O(n)-BCB in Figure 1. O(n) communication is clearly tight because every party at least needs to
receive the input value from the sender.
Theorem 1. For all constant ε > 0, there exists a Byzantine consistent broadcast protocol with
communication complexity O(n) tolerating f ≤ (12 − ε)n faults for all n.
Intuitive overview. As one can expect, achieving consistency is the hardest part here. Let us
first comment on why linear BCB is easy if f < n/3 [25, 8, 7, 27]. With n > 3f , it is well known
we can use quorums of n − f > 2f , and then two quorums will intersect at ≥ f + 1 parties. In
other words, if we call a quorum of votes a certificate, there cannot exist conflicting certificates,
because that would require at least one honest party to vote for both conflicting values. This gives
rise to the following protocol where everyone interacts with the designated sender only. The sender
proposes a value to everyone, collects their votes into a certificate, and then sends the certificate to
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everyone. A party, upon seeing the certificate, can decide on that value safely. Using a threshold
signature scheme for the certificate, the communication is linear [7].
However, this method breaks down for f ≥ n/3 due to the well-known “split-brain” attack.
Suppose n = 3f and parties are divided into three groups P , Q and R each of size f . Suppose the
sender is in R and the f parties (including the sender) in R are Byzantine. If P and Q never talk
to each other, R can easily simulate one execution with P and another execution with Q, leading
them to decide conflicting values. Now it seems natural that parties need to echo the sender’s
proposed value so that they can detect if the sender “equivocates”, i.e., proposing different values
to different parties. This “everyone echo” step will trivially incur quadratic communication.
The central technique in the O(n)-BCB protocol is to let each party echo the sender’s proposed
value to a constant set of neighbors in a predefined communication graph. We will show that if the
graph is a good expander, then the equivocation detection power is sufficient to achieve consistency.
Definition 5 (Expander). Let α and β be constants satisfying 0 < α < β < 1. An (n, α, β)-
expander is a graph of n vertices such that, for any set S of αn vertices, the number of neighbors
of S is more than βn.
It is well-known that for any n and 0 < α < β < 1, (n, α, β)-expanders with constant degrees
exist. For our purpose, we need an (n, 2ε, 1 − 2ε)-expander; in other words, we set α = 2ε and
β = 1− 2ε. Henceforth, we write an (n, 2ε, 1− 2ε)-expander as Gn,ε. We give a simple randomized
construction in Appendix B. It is important to note that even if we use a randomized expander
construction, the BCB protocol is still deterministic, because all the randomization happens in the
offline “BCB protocol design” phase. Once a required expander Gn,ε is found, it can be harded-
coded into the BCB protocol. Nonetheless, deterministic expander constructions also exist, e.g.,
Cayley graphs and Ramanujan graphs [5].
With a required expander Gn,ε, the protocol works as follows. Upon receiving the sender’s
proposal, every party echos it to its neighbors in Gn,ε before sending a vote for the proposal (to the
sender only). This way, with constant communication per party, we have the following guarantee.
If a quorum of n− f parties vote for the proposal, at least n− 2f = 2εn parties are honest. They
will echo the proposal to their neighbors in Gn,ε. Due to the expansion property of Gn,ε, they have
> (1− 2ε)n ≥ 2f neighbors. Out of these, > f are honest and will not vote for a conflicting value.
This prevents the creation of a conflicting certificate.
Correctness of the protocol. We prove the correctness of the protocolO(n)-BCB, which proves
Theorem 1.
Theorem 2 (Consistency). If two honest parties r and r′ decide values v and v′, then v = v′.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction two distinct values v and v′ are both decided. Then
two conflicting certificates C(v) and C(v′) are created. If C(v) is created, then at least 2εn honest
parties must have sent votes for v in round 3. Then, they must have propagated the proposal of v
(signed by the sender) in round 2. Due to the expansion property of Gn,ε, more than (1−2ε)n ≥ 2f
parties must have received it at the end of round 3, out of which more than f are honest parties.
Thus, less than n− f parties will vote for v′ 6= v, so C(v′) cannot be created. We have obtained a
contradiction.
Theorem 3 (Validity). If the sender rs is honest, then all honest parties decide the input value
vin and terminate.
5
O(n)-BCB 
Let rs be the designated sender and vin be its input value. Let r be a party. “Propagate”
means sending to all neighbors in Gn,ε and “multicast” means sending to all n parties.
– Round 1 (Propose): rs multicasts the input value vin in a message 〈propose, vin〉rs .
– Round 2 (Echo): If a party r receives 〈propose, v〉rs , propagates the propose message.
– Round 3 (Vote): If r propagates 〈propose, v〉rs and does not receive 〈propose, v′〉rs for
a different value v′ 6= v in Round 2, then r sends rs a vote for v in the form of 〈vote, v〉r.
– Round 4 (Forward): If rs receives a quorum (n−f) of 〈vote, v〉r′ , denoted a certificate
C(v), then rs multicasts C(v).
If r receives C(v), it decides v and terminates.
C(v) is batched into one message using a threshold signature scheme with a threshold of n− f
out of n. 
Figure 1: Byzantine Consistent Broadcast with O(n) Communications and f ≤ (12 − ε)n.
Proof. An honest sender multicasts a proposal for the input value vin (and no other value), collects
enough votes, and multicasts C(vin). All honest parties decide vin and terminate.
Theorem 4 (Communication Complexity). Communication complexity is O(n).
Proof. The sender sends at most 2n messages and each party additionally sends at most d + 1
messages, where d is the degree of the expander Gn,ε and is a constant (Theorem 13). Therefore,
the communication complexity is 2n+ (d+ 1)n = O(n).
4 A Quadratic Lower Bound for Byzantine Consistent Broadcast
In this section, we show in Theorem 5 that under Byzantine majority, BCB requires quadratic
communication. This shows that if linear communication is desired, the O(n)-BCB protocol in the
previous section achieves close to optimal resilience (modulo ε terms).
Theorem 5. For all constant ε > 0, if a protocol solves BCB with f ≥ (12 + ε)n for all n, its
communication complexity is Ω(n2).
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, for some positive constant ε, there exists a BCB
protocol with a communication complexity of γ(n) = o(n2) and resilience f ≥ (12 + ε)n for all n.
Let rs be the sender. Let S and S
′ be two disjoint sets of non-sender parties of size dn−12 e and
bn−12 c, respectively. We consider three executions.
In the first execution (W1), all parties in S′ crash and all other parties are honest. This is
clearly within the fault tolerance threshold as |S′| = bn−12 c < f . Let the input value vin = 0. By
validity, all parties in S decide 0. The second execution (W2) is symmetric. All parties in S crash
and all other parties are honest. The input value vin = 1. By validity, all parties in S
′ decide 1.
Let d(n) = 8γ(n)/(εn). Since γ(n) = o(n2), when n is sufficiently large, we have γ(n)/n2 <
ε2/32, which implies that d(n) = 8γ(n)/(εn) < εn/4.
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Now, we partition the parties as follows. We say two parties communicated in an execution if
at least one of them sends a message to the other.
1. rs: the designated sender.
2. R: the set of parties who communicate with more than d(n) parties in either W1 or W2.
Note that to keep the communication complexity at γ(n), at most 2γ(n)/d(n) parties can
communicate with more than d(n) parties in one execution. Thus, |R| ≤ 4γ(n)/d(n) = εn/2.
3. r′ ∈ (S′ −R): a party in S′ that is not in R.
4. V ′ = S′ −R− {r′}: the set of remaining parties in S′.
5. Vf ⊂ (S −R): the set of parties in S −R who communicate with r′ in either W1 or W2.
Note that |Vf | ≤ 2d(n) since r′ 6∈ R.
6. Vh = S −R− Vf : the set of remaining parties in S.
Now we define a third execution W3: r′ and Vh are honest, and the other parties (including the
sender rs) are all Byzantine. This is within the fault threshold, because the number of faults is,
n− |Vh| − 1 ≤ n− (|S| − (|R|+ |Vf |))− 1
≤ (n− dn− 1
2
e) + |R|+ 2d(n)− 1
≤ n/2 + |R|+ 2d(n)− 1/2
< n/2 + εn/2 + εn/2 = n(
1
2
+ ε).
The last step is due to two facts we established earlier: |R| < εn/2 and d(n) < εn/4 when n is
sufficiently large.
In W3, faulty parties behave in the following manner. Parties in S behave in the same way
as in W1, except that (i) they do not send any messages to parties in S′, and (ii) they ignore all
messages from S′. Parties in S′ behave in the same way as in W2, except that (i) they do not
send any messages to parties in S, and (ii) they ignore all messages from S. The faulty sender rs
behaves like in W1 towards S and behaves like in W2 towards S′.
We will show that Vh cannot distinguish W1 and W3 and that r
′ cannot distinguish W2 and W3.
Note that all parties other than Vh and r
′ are Byzantine and will behave towards them accordingly
in W3 the way they did in W1 and W2, respectively. So we just need to further show that Vh
and r′ do not communicate with each other in W3. Suppose towards a contradiction that they do.
Then there is a first message sent between them in W3. Before that message, Vh cannot distinguish
W1 and W3 because all parties other than r′ communicate with them in the same manner in both
executions. Thus, the source of the message cannot be Vh, because they do not send messages to r
′
in W1. On the other hand, r′ cannot distinguish W2 and W3 before that message either, because
all parties other than Vh communicate with them in the same manner in both executions. Thus,
the source of the message cannot be r′ for the same reason. Thus, r′ and Vh do not communicate
with each other.
Therefore, Vh cannot distinguish W1 and W3, and decide 0 in W3. At the same time, r
′ cannot
distinguish W2 and W3, and decides 1 in W3. Thus, consistency is violated in W3, which is a
contradiction to the existence of such a protocol.
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5 Byzantine Broadcast and Agreement
In Section 3, we introduced a BCB protocol with O(n) communication complexity. In this section,
we extend it into BB/BA protocols with quadratic communication complexity. We name the
protocols O(n2)-BB and O(n2)-BA.
Theorem 6. For all constant ε > 0, there exists Byzantine broadcast and agreement protocols with
O(n2) communication complexity tolerating f ≤ (12 − ε)n faults for all n.
5.1 Byzantine Broadcast
The O(n2)-BB protocol is described in Figure 2.
Definitions and notations. The protocol proceeds in iterations with a constant number of
rounds per iteration. Each iteration has a leader. We use Li to denote the leader of iteration i.
The leader of the very first iteration is the designated sender, i.e., L1 = rs. The leader schedule
can be follow a simple round-robin order (or any non-repeating order) after the first iteration.
Similar as before, a quorum of votes for a value v in iteration i is called an iteration-i certificate
for v, and is denoted Ci(v). We say v is certified in iteration i if Ci(v) exists. As before, Ci(v) are
batched into one message using a threshold signature scheme with a threshold of n − f out of n.
The certificates are ranked by the iteration in which they are formed, i.e., the rank of Ci(v) is i.
For convenience, we sometimes compare the rank of a certificate with ⊥, which we define to have
a rank of −1, i.e., lower than all certificates.
Intuitive overview. Intuitively, each iteration runs an instance of O(n)-BCB (round 1–4), where
the leader serves as the BCB sender. If the leader is honest, all honest parties can decide the value
proposed by the leader, by the validity of BCB. Furthermore, conflicting values cannot be decided in
the same iteration, by the consistency of BCB. The additional challenge here is to ensure decisions
are consistent across iterations. Towards this end, we add another propagation step and a locking
mechanism (which is pioneered by Paxos [20] and common in BFT [8, 27]).
We define a new message type echoed. A quorum of echoed messages for an object b in iteration
i is denoted by Ei(b). A party sends an echoed message for an object b when it propagates b in
the expander graph. Thus, Ei(b) serves as a proof that enough honest parties have propagated b.
We remark that the object b will be a certificate itself in our protocol. A party decides a value v
if it receives Ei(Ci(v)). This means more than n − 2f = 2εn parties propagated Ci(v). Again due
to the expander graph, more than f honest parties will receive Ci(v). These parties will “lock” on
Ci(v) by setting a local variable locki,r = Ci(v) in round 7. When the next leader Li+1 proposes a
value v′ along with a corresponding certificate Ci′(v′), a party r does not vote for v′ if the certificate
Ci′(v′) in the proposal is lower than its lock locki,r. This ensures that whenever an honest party
decides, certificates for conflicting values cannot be created in subsequent iterations, guaranteeing
consistency.
Correctness of the protocol. We prove the correctness of the protocol O(n2)-BB, which proves
Theorem 6.
Lemma 1. If an honest party decides a value v in iteration i, then for all iteration j ≥ i, if Cj(v′)
exists, then v′ = v.
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O(n2)-BB 
Let rs be the designated sender and vin be its input value. Let r be a party. “Propagate”
means sending to all neighbors in Gn,ε and “multicast” means sending to all n parties.
The protocol proceeds in iterations 1 ≤ i ≤ f + 1. The leader of iteration i is denoted Li.
lock0,r is initialized to ⊥. The protocol for iteration i is as follows.
– Round 1 (Propose): Li multicasts a proposal 〈propose, v, P, i〉Li , where v and P are
selected as follows.
(a) If i = 1, then v = vin and P = ⊥;
(b) Else if locki−1,r 6= ⊥, then v is the value certified in locki−1,r and P = locki−1,r;
(c) Else, then v is picked freely and P = ⊥.
– Round 2 (Echo): If a party r receives 〈propose, v, P, i〉Li , r propagates the proposal.
– Round 3 (Vote): If a party r propagates 〈propose, v, P, i〉Li and does not receive
〈propose, v′, P ′, i〉Li for a different value v′ 6= v in Round 2, and if the rank of P is not
lower than locki−1,r, then r sends rs a vote for v in the form of 〈vote, v, i〉r.
– Round 4 (Forward): If Li receives n−f 〈vote, v, i〉r′ , denoted Ci(v), then multicast Ci(v).
– Round 5 (Echo): If r receives Ci(v), r propagates Ci(v) and sends 〈echoed, Ci(v), i〉r to Li.
– Round 6 (Forward): If Li receives n− f of 〈echoed, Ci(v), i〉r′ , denoted by Ei(Ci(v)), then
multicast Ei(Ci(v)).
At the end of the round, if r receives Ei(Ci(v)), r decides v.
If r has received Ci(v) in any of Round 3, 4, 5, or 6 in this iteration, r sets locki,r = Ci(v);
else r sets locki,r = locki−1,r.
– Round 7 (Status): r sends locki,r to Li+1.
At the end of the round, Li+1 picks a highest certificate it receives, and sets locki,r to it. 
Figure 2: Byzantine Broadcast with O(n2) communication and f ≤ (12 − ε)n.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the iteration number. The base case (j = i) follows from the
consistency of BCB (Theorem 2).
Before moving on to the inductive case, we show that there is a set R of honest parties with
|R| > f that all lock on Ci(v) by the end of iteration i. As some honest party decides v in iteration
i, that honest party must have observed Ei(Ci(v)) at the end of round 6. Then, in round 5, at least
2εn honest parties must have propagated Ci(v), and more than 2f parties must have received Ci(v)
by round 6. Thus, more than f honest parties have received Ci(v). This will be the desired set R.
Since there is no certificate for any different value in iteration i, in round 7, every party r ∈ R sets
locki,r = Ci(v).
Next, suppose the inductive hypothesis holds up to j, we will prove it for j + 1. Note that at
the beginning of iteration j + 1, parties in R are still locked on certificates for v (possibly from
an iteration higher than i), because due to the inductive hypothesis, no certificate for a different
value can be higher than Ci(v) up till that point. Furthermore, each r ∈ R will not vote for a value
v′ 6= v because doing so requires observing at the beginning of Round 3, a certificate Ci′(v′) that is
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higher than lockj,r (which is at least as high as Ci(v)). Such a Ci′(v′), again, does not exist up till
that point due to the inductive hypothesis. Therefore, a value v′ 6= v will not get enough (n − f)
votes to have a certificate in iteration j + 1.
Theorem 7 (Consistency). If two honest parties r and r′ decide values v and v′, respectively, then
v = v′.
Proof. Suppose two values v and v′ are both decided. Let i and i′ the iterations in which v and v′
are decided, respectively. Without loss of generality, we assume i ≤ i′. Since all decided values are
certified, by Lemma 1, v = v′.
Theorem 8 (Validity). If the sender rs is honest, all honest parties decide the input value vin and
terminate.
Proof. Termination is clear as all parties terminate after the last round (Round 7) of the last
iteration (iteration f + 1). We next prove all parties decide vin. Note that L1 = rs. If rs is honest,
it proposes vin, collects and multicasts C1(vin), collects and multicasts E1(C1(vin)), and makes all
honest parties decide vin in iteration 1.
Theorem 9 (Termination). Every honest party decides a value and terminates.
Proof. Termination is clear as all parties terminate after the last round (Round 7) of the last
iteration (iteration f + 1). We next prove all parties decide.
If the sender is honest, all honest parties decide vin by validity. If a leader Li of an iteration
i > 1 is honest, then Li proposes the value of locki−1,L if it is not ⊥, or a freely selected value
otherwise. Since all honest parties r send their locki−1,r to Li in Round 7 of the previous iteration
i− 1 and Li picks a highest one to be its own locki−1,Li , we have that locki−1,Li must be at least as
high as any locki−1,r. Therefore, all honest parties will vote for the value Li proposes and decide
the value. Since at most f parties can be faulty, there exists an iteration with an honest leader.
Thus, all honest parties decide a value by iteration f + 1.
Theorem 10 (Communication Complexity). Communication complexity is O(n2).
Proof. In each iteration, the leader sends at most 3n messages, and each party additionally sends
at most 2d+3 messages, where d is the degree of the expander Gn,ε and is a constant (Theorem 13).
Therefore, the communication complexity is (3n+ (2d+ 3)n)(f + 1) = O(n2)
Round complexity. Though round complexity is not the focus of this paper, we briefly discuss
it. The round complexity of the above protocol is O(f). We could easily improve the round
complexity to be O(t) where t is the number of actual faults, i.e., achieving an “early stopping”
property [11]. When a party r decides a value v, multicasts 〈decide, v〉r. Upon receiving more than
f decide messages for v, a party batches them into one threshold signature and multicasts it, and
then terminates. By iteration t + 1, an honest leader emerges and thus all honest parties decide
some value v, send decide messages for v, receive enough of them, send out a threshold signature
of it, and terminate.
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O(n2)-BA 
Let r be a party and let vin be its input value. “Propagate” means sending to all neighbors in
Gn,ε and “multicast” means sending to all n parties.
The protocol proceeds in iterations 1 ≤ i ≤ f + 1. The leader of iteration i is denoted Li. But
the protocol has one extra round before the first iteration.
• Round of preprocessing: Multicast the input vin in the form of 〈vote, vin, 0〉r.
At the end of this round, if r receives C0(v), set lock0,r to C0(v); else, set lock0,r to ⊥.
The protocol for iteration i is as follows.
– Round 1 (Propose): Li multicasts a proposal 〈propose, v, P, i〉Li , where v and P are
selected as follows.
(a) If locki−1,r 6= ⊥, then v is the value certified in locki−1,r and P = locki−1,r;
(b) Else, then v is picked freely and P = ⊥.
– Round 2–7: identical to O(n2)-BB. 
Figure 3: Byzantine Agreement with O(n2) communication and f ≤ (12 − ε)n.
5.2 Byzantine Agreement
Next, we change O(n2)-BB into a Byzantine agreement protocol O(n2)-BA with two simple mod-
ifications. The full description of O(n2)-BA is in Figure 3.
1. Before starting the iterations, we add a preprocessing round in which each party r votes for
its input v in the form of 〈vote, v, 0〉r. At the end of this round, if a party receives C0(v), it
sets lock0,r to C0(v). Note that ⊥ (with rank −1) is still lower than C0(v).
2. The first rule in proposal value selection (related to the designated sender) is removed
naturally. The first leader L1 (which is now an ordinary party) proposes v if it has set
lock0,L1 = C0(v).
Correctness of the Protocol. Consistency, termination, and asymptotic complexity ofO(n2)-BA
are identical to those of O(n2)-BB. Only the validity proof changes slightly: If all honest parties
have the same input value v, then all honest parties lock on C0(v) before the iterations start; then,
no other value can become certified, guaranteeing validity.
Theorem 11 (Validity). If all honest parties has a same input value v, then all honest parties
decide v and terminate.
Proof. If all honest parties has a same input value v, then at the end of the preprocessing round,
all honest parties receive C0(v) and set lock0,r = C0(v). Therefore, in iteration 1 and inductively
all iterations i, no honest party votes for any values v′ 6= v. So Ci(v′) will not be created and v′
cannot be decided. Similar to the proof of Theorem 9, one of the leaders will be honest. In an
honest leader’s iteration, all honest parties decide and they decide v.
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6 BFT Replication with Linear Communicatins
This section presents a BFT replication protocol O(n)-BFT with linear communication, based
on O(n)-BCB. Before showing the protocol, we briefly review BFT replication. BFT replication
(BFT for short) achieves a replicated state machine, where requests from external clients lead
to state transitions. Overall, it provides clients with a fault-tolerant distributed service that has
the same abstraction as a single non-faulty server. To provide a consistent and available service,
parties continuously decide and agree on a totally-ordered sequence of requests, called a log. These
requirements are formalized as safety and liveness in Appendix C.
Our protocol O(n)-BFT relies on the stable-leader approach. That is, an honest leader contin-
uously proposes values to append to the log. When the leader becomes faulty, it will be replaced.
A reign of a leader is called a view, which is analogous to an iteration in the BB/BA protocol
in Section 5. Consistency within the same view is provided by BCB. Consistency across views is
ensured by the locking mechanism similar to the BB/BA protocol.
We will also extend the O(n)-BCB protocol to work without lock-step rounds to make the
protocol more practical. This creates a new challenge as parties now are no longer perfectly syn-
chronized. The concrete challenge for our protocol is to ensure that when the first honest party
votes for a value, propagation has already completed, i.e., more than f honest parties have already
observed the value. Without lock-step rounds, parties may vote at slightly different times and the
first honest party may vote before propagation completes. Thus, a naive extension of O(n)-BCB
fails to achieve consistency. To make sure parties vote after propagation completes, we make two
modifications: (i) in the echo phase, a party sends the leader an echoed message for the value v, and
(ii) a party votes ∆ time (a known upper bound on the communication delay) after receiving E(v).
Since E(v) serves as a proof of propagation as in O(n2)-BB, waiting for this ∆ time ensures that
the propagation is completed. The detailed protocol description and correctness proof are given in
Appendix C.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we provided three new results: (1) a BCB protocol with linear communications under
honest majority, (2) a quadratic communication lower bound to solve BCB under fault majority,
(3) BB and BA protocols with quadratic communication. Towards practical applications, we give
a BFT replication protocol with linear communication.
Since our protocols require f < (1/2 − ε)n, some gaps in communication complexity remain,
e.g., BA with (1/2− ε)n < f < n/2, and BCB/BB with f > (1/2− ε)n. These are intriguing open
questions for future work.
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A A Quadratic Lower Bound on Communication Complexity for
Byzantine Reliable Broadcast
It is well known that quadratic communications are necessary to achieve BB [10]. In this section,
we will show in Theorem 12 that BRB, which is much easier than BB, has the same lower bound on
communication complexity. The proof is a straightforward extension from [10]. The only difference
is that our proof relies on totality, while the proof in [10] relies on termination.
Theorem 12. There does not exist a BRB protocol with communication complexity of at most
f2/4.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, there exists a BRB protocol with communication
complexity of at most f2/4. Without loss of generality, we assume that there exists a set of
d(n − 1)/2e parties different from a sender rs (say R) that do not decide a certain value v if they
receive no messages. There must exist such a value since otherwise, there exist two different values
that at least one party decides both if it receives no messages. We consider a network that has the
following two partitions.
1. A: a set of df/2e parties, which is a subset of R.
2. B: all remaining parties including a sender rs.
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We consider two executions that violate either consistency or totality. In the first execution
(W1), all parties in A are Byzantine, and the sender’s input value is v. Parties in A do not
communicate with each other. Toward B, parties in A execute honestly except that they ignore the
first df/2e messages from B. By validity, all parties in B decide v. Here, since the communication
complexity of the protocol is at most f2/4, there exists a party (say p) in A that receives at most
df/2e messages from B. Let Bp be a set of all parties that send messages to p.
In the second execution (W2), all parties in A except p are Byzantine and all parties in Bp are
Byzantine. This gives a total of (df/2e−1)+df/2e ≤ f faults as allowed. The sender’s input value
is also v. All parties in Bp execute in the same way as in W1 except that they do not send any
messages to p. Ap execute in the same way as in W1. Here, since p cannot receive any messages, p
executes in the same way as in W1. Therefore, parties in B \ Bp cannot distinguish W1 and W2,
thus decide v. On the other hand, p does not receive any messages, and since p ∈ R, it does not
decide v. If p decides a certain value v′ 6= v, then consistency is violated. If p does not decide,
then totality is violated because honest parties in B But it is a violation of totality because honest
parties in B \ Bp have decided. Thus, it is a contradiction and such a BRB protocol does not
exist.
B Expander
We show that an expander Gε in the Definition 5 exists for all positive constant ε. We use Γ(V,G)
to denote a set of all neighbors of V in a graph G.
Theorem 13 (Existence of Expander). For all positive integer n and positive constant ε, there
exists an expander Gn,ε.
Proof. Let c = 2ε. Consider a random d degree graph G taking the union of random d perfect
matchings (if n is odd, the first party has two links). In each perfect matching P , for any set of
cn parties (say S), and any set of (1 − c)n parties (say T ), the probability that Γ(S, P ) ⊆ T is
bounded above by,
Pr[Γ(S, P ) ⊆ T ] ≤ ((1− c)n
n
)
cn
2 = (1− c) cn2 .
Thus, the probability that any set of cn parties does not expand in the graph, i.e., |Γ(S,G)| ≤
(1− c)n for any S, is bounded above by,(
n
cn
)(
n
(1− c)n
)
(1− c) cdn2
≤ (e
c
)cn(
e
1− c)
(1−c)n(1− c) cdn2
≤ (e(1
c
)c)(
1
1− c)
1+c( d
2
−1))n
For a sufficiently large constant d, the above probability is exponentially small, which means
there is non-zero (in fact, overwhelmingly large) probability that a randomly chosen graph is an
expander. Thus, Gn,ε exists.
15
C BFT Replication with Linear Communication
C.1 Model
In this section, we do not assume lock-step execution of rounds following recent practical syn-
chronous BFT protocols [3]. Instead, parties proceed in real time. In this model, the synchrony
assumption states that a message sent by an honest party at time t will be received by an honest
recipient by time t + ∆, where ∆ is the known upper bound on message delay. The replication
protocol additionally uses a cryptographic hash function H.
BFT replication. BFT replication (BFT for short) achieves a replicated state machine. External
clients send requests to all parties, and all honest parties continuously decide a sequence of requests
in a linearizable log, with the two requirements below.
Definition 6 (Byzantine Fault Tolerant Replication). A Byzantine fault tolerant replication pro-
tocol must satisfy (i) safety: if two honest parties decide requests c and c′ at the same log position,
then c = c′, and (ii) liveness: all client requests are eventually decided by all honest parties.
Communication complexity. Since a BFT replication protocol runs forever, its communication
complexity is typically (and naturally) defined in an amortized sense: the amount of communication
needed per consensus decision (i.e., per log record).
C.2 Protocol Description
The description of the protocol O(n)-BFT in detail is in Figure 4.
Definitions and notations. The protocol proceeds in views identified by a monotonically in-
creasing integers starting from 1. In each view, client requests are decided in a process called
steady-state, directed by a party selected as leader. When a leader is faulty and honest parties fails
to process client requests, a fallback process called view-change is invoked to change the view and
the leader.
In steady-state, client requests are batched into a block and proposed by a leader. Each block Bk
includes (i) bk: a batch of client requests with a total-order, and (ii) hk−1: a hash of a block which
Bk refers to. The hash references, starting from the first block called genesis block hard-coded in
the protocol denoted by B0 = (⊥,⊥), form a chain of blocks so-called blockchain. The height k of
a block Bk is naturally defined as its position in the blockchain. We say a block Bk = (bk, hk−1) is
valid if (i) there is a valid block Bk−1 and hk−1 = H(Bk−1), or (ii) Bk is the genesis block. We say
a block B extends B′ if B = B′ or B is a descendant of B′. If two blocks B and B′ do not extend
one another, we say B and B′ conflict with each other.
Similar to the Byzantine consensus protocols presented in the previous sections, each non-leader
sends vote/echoed message for a block proposed by a leader. A quorum of votes for a value v in
view i is called a certificate for v in view i, and denoted by Ci(v). We say a value v is certified in
view i if Ci(v) exists. The genesis block is considered certified automatically. All certificates are
ranked first by view number, and then by height. For example, a certificate Ci(Bk) is higher in rank
than Ci−1(Bk+1) but lower in rank than a Ci(Bk+1). A quorum of echoed messages for an object b
in view i is denoted as Ei(b); note that b may be a certificate.
Each party multicasts a blame message if it fails to decide blocks in a predefined time or detects
any faulty behavior by the leader. A set of f + 1 blame messages in view i is denoted by B(i),
which triggers a view-change.
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O(n)-BFT 
Let L be a leader of view i, L′ be a leader of view i + 1, and r be a replica. “Propagate”
means sending to all neighbors in Gn,ε and “multicast” means sending to all n parties. Party
r executes the following steady-state process. If r receives an invalid block, ignores it.
1. Propose: L multicasts 〈propose, Bk, P, i〉L, (i) at the beginning of the iteration, or (ii)
upon receiving a new highest certificate of the current iteration Ci(Bk−1). P is a highest
certificate Cj(Bk−1) in case (i), or Ci(Bk−1) in case (ii). Bk = (bk, hk−1) and bk is a batch
of client requests and hk−1 is a hash of Bk−1.
2. Echo: If r receives 〈propose, Bk, Cj(Bk−1), i〉L, propagates it, and sends 〈echoed, Bk, i〉r
to L.
3. Vote: If L receives n− f of 〈echoed, Bk, i〉r′ , denoted by Ei(Bk), multicasts Ei(Bk). If r
receives Ei(Bk) and corresponding proposal, wait for ∆, and sends 〈vote, Bk, i〉r to L, if
Bk is a descendant of a certified block as high in rank as locki−1,r.
4. Echo: If receives n − f of 〈vote, Bk, i〉r′ , denoted by Ci(Bk), propagates it, and sends
〈echoed, Ci(Bk), i〉r to L. L multicasts Ci(Bk).
5. Decide: If r receives n− f of 〈echoed, Ci(Bk), i〉r′ , denoted by Ei(Ci(Bk)), decide Bk and
all its ancestors. L multicasts Ei(Ci(Bk))
Party r simultaneously executes the following view-change process.
1. Blame: If (i) less than p blocks are decided within (11 + 2(p − 1))∆ time in view i, or
(ii) two conflicting blocks are proposed in view i, multicasts 〈blame, i〉r. In the case of
(ii), multicasts the two blocks and stop all processes in the steady-state.
2. Quit & Lock: If r receives f + 1 of 〈blame, i〉r′ , denoted by B(i), multicasts it, stop all
processes in the steady-state, and wait for 2∆ (4∆ if L′). Set locki,r a highest certified
block, send it to L′ and start the next view i+ 1. 
Figure 4: BFT Replication with O(n) Communications and f ≤ (12 − ε)n
C.3 Correctness of the Protocol
We prove the correctness of the protocol O(n)-BFT with f ≤ (12−ε)n for all n and for any positive
constant ε.
Lemma 2 (Certified without Equivocation). If two certificates Ci(B) and Ci(B′) are both created
in the same view i, then B and B′ do not conflict with each other.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, two conflicting certificates Ci(B) and Ci(B′) are both
created in the same view i. Let tc be the time when the first honest party votes for B, and tq
be the time when Ei(B) is created. For B′, define t′c and t′q in the same way as above. We have
tc ≥ tq + ∆, because an honest party votes for a block after waiting for ∆. Then, Ei(B′) could not
have been created by tq, i.e., tq < t
′
q. Otherwise, there is at least 2εn honest parties who must have
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propagated B′ by tq. Due to the expansion property of Gn,ε, more than f honest parties must have
received B′ by time tc. It would prevent Ci(B) from being created. Similarly, Ei(B) could not have
been created by t′q, i.e., t′q < tq. These propositions contradict each other.
We say a party r directly decides a block B in view i, if r has not decided its descendants at
the time r decides B.
Lemma 3. If an honest party directly decides a block Bk in view i, then for all view j ≥ i, if a
block B as high in rank as Bk is certified in view j, then B extends Bk.
Proof. We prove it by induction on the view number. The base case (j = i) is clear by Lemma 2.
Before moving on to the inductive step, we prove that there is a set R of more than f honest
parties, such that for each party r ∈ R, locki,r extends Bk. Suppose an honest party directly
decides a block Bk in view i, then this party must have received Ei(Ci(Bk)), which implies at least
a quorum (n−f) of party parties (hence at least 2εn honest parties) must have propagated Ci(Bk).
Let t be the time when the 2εn-th honest party (call it p) propagates Ci(Bk). Then, more than
2f parties must have received Ci(Bk) by t + ∆. Out of these, more than f are honest, and this is
the desired set R. Next, we show that no party r ∈ R sets locki,r before t+ ∆. This is because, if
any r ∈ R does, then it must have observed B(v) before t− 2∆, and multicast it. Then, all honest
parties must have received B(v) and stopped all processes in the steady-state by time t. This would
prevent p from sending an echoed message for Ci(Bk) at time t, which is a contradiction. Since
all certified blocks in view i do not conflict with each other, every parties r ∈ R sets locki,r to a
certified block that extends Bk.
Next, we prove the inductive step (view j + 1). Here, by inductive hypothesis, all certificates
as high in rank as Ci(Bk) extend Bk. Thus, all parties in R still lock on a descendant of Bk at the
beginning of view j + 1. Suppose for the sake of contradiction, there exists a certificate Cj+1(B) as
high in rank as Ci(Bk) and B does not extends Bk. Let Cj+1(Bmin) be the lowest ranked certificate
in view j + 1 that B extends. There exists such a Bmin since B itself satisfies these conditions.
Then, there exist a set of n − f parties (say R′) that have voted for Bmin. Then, there exists
a certificate Cj′(B−1min) where j′ ≤ j and Bmin extends B−1min, such that for every party r′ ∈ R′,
Cj′(B−1min) is as high in rank as lockj,r′ . Then, Cj′(B−1min) is as high in rank as Ci(Bk). Otherwise,
there exists an honest party h ∈ R′ such that lockj,h is higher in rank than Cj′(B−1min) because R and
R′ intersect. Then, by inductive hypothesis, B−1min extends Bk, which contradicts the hypothesis
that B does not extend Bk.
Theorem 14 (Safety). If two honest parties decide requests c and c′, respectively, at the same log
position, then c = c′.
Proof. We first prove that honest parties will not decide different blocks at the same height. Suppose
two distinct blocks Bk and B
′
k are both decided by honest parties. Suppose each decision is a result
of direct decision of Bl and B
′
l. Here, all directly decided block are certified. Therefore, by Lemma
2 and Lemma 3, Bl and B
′
l do not conflict with each other, thus Bk = B
′
k.
Since all client requests in a block are totally-ordered, and two different blocks are not decided
at the same height, two different requests are not decided at the same log position.
In order to achieve liveness strictly, we also need to deal with censorship resistance i.e., no
client’s requests are being blocked by the leader. It is not hard to prevent censorship using additional
mechanisms such as changing leaders every certain number of blocks or having time-outs for each
request. However, for simplicity, we omit these details and assume that faulty leaders that censor
client requests will be replaced.
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Theorem 15 (Liveness). All clients requests are eventually decided by all honest parties.
Proof. We first prove that all honest parties continuously decide blocks. Suppose all honest parties
permanently stay in view i. Then, at least an honest party decides blocks continually in view i,
otherwise all honest parties multicast blame and invoke view-change. If an honest party decides
a block B in view i and all honest parties do not invoke view-change, all honest parties receive
Ei(Ci(B)) and decide B. And thus, all honest parties can continuously decide blocks.
Suppose the first honest party receives B(v) at time t, then all honest parties receive it by time
t + ∆, and start the next view i + 1 after 2∆ if it is not the leader Li+1 of view i + 1. Therefore,
all honest parties other than Li+1 send their lockv, and start view i + 1 within [t + 2∆, t + 3∆].
Since Li+1 wait for 4∆ after receiving B(v), Li+1 start view i+ 1 at least after t+ 4∆. Thus, Li+1
can receive lockv, of all honest parties before starting the next view. If Li+1 is honest, it proposes
blocks extending a block as high in rank as lockv, of all honest parties, every α time at least after
t + 5∆. And then, all honest parties can decide at least p blocks by t + (13 + 2(p − 1))∆, and
do not multicast blame, and thus B(v + 1) is not created. Even if some leaders are faulty, after
at most f view-change, all honest parties can continuously decide blocks under an honest leader.
Since faulty leaders that censor requests will be replaced, all requests are eventually decided by all
honest parties.
Theorem 16 (Communication Complexity). Communication complexity is O(n).
Proof. Suppose a leader of view i is honest. Then, to decide each block, the leader sends at most
4n messages, and each party additionally sends at most 2d + 3 messages, where d is the degree
of the expander Gn,ε and is a constant. Thus, the communication required per decision is O(n).
A total of O(n3) communication may be spent on replacing up to f faulty leaders. However, as
parties can decide a growing number of decisions, the communication required per decision (or the
amortized communication complexity) converges to O(n).
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